

TOP SECRET

Soviet industrial capacity. This loss would not be permanent and could either be alleviated by Soviet recuperative action or augmented depending upon the weight and effectiveness of follow-up attacks.

10. Of outstanding importance is the prospect that the petroleum industry in the U.S.S.R. would suffer severe damage especially in refining capacity. The supply of high test aviation gasoline would become rapidly critical.

PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

11. The initial atomic offensive could produce as many as 2,700,000 mortalities, and 4,000,000 additional casualties, depending upon the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures. A large number of homes would be destroyed and the problems of living for the remainder of the 28,000,000 people in the 70 target cities would be vastly complicated.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

12. The atomic offensive would not, per se, bring about capitulation, destroy the roots of Communism or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the people.

13. For the majority of Soviet people, atomic bombing would validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers, stimulate resentment against the United States, unify these people and increase their will to fight. Among an indeterminate minority, atomic bombing might stimulate dissidence and the hope of relief from oppression. Unless and until vastly more favorable opportunities develop for them, the influence of these elements will not appreciably affect the Soviet war effort.

14. A psychological crisis will be created within the U.S.S.R. which could be turned to advantage by the Allies through early and effective exploitation by armed forces and psychological warfare. Failing prompt and effective exploitation, the opportunity would be lost and subsequent Soviet psychological reactions would adversely affect the accomplishment of Allied objectives.